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ABSTRACT
The never-before-seen proliferation of interconnected low-power computing devices, patently dubbed
the Internet of Things (IoT), is revolutionizing how people, organizations, and malicious actors
interact with one another and the Internet. Many of these devices collect data in different forms,
be it audio, location data, or user commands. In civil or criminal nature investigations, the data
collected can act as evidence for the prosecution or the defense. This data can also be used as a
component of cybersecurity efforts. When data is extracted from these devices, investigators are
expected to do so using proven methods. Still, unfortunately, given the heterogeneity in the types
of devices that need to be examined, few widely agreed-upon standards exist. In this paper, we
look at some of the architectures, current frameworks, and methods available to perform forensic
analysis of IoT devices to provide a roadmap for investigators and researchers to form the basis of
an investigation.
Keywords: Internet of things, IoT, forensics, architecture, tools

1.

INTRODUCTION

great interest to forensic investigators looking to
learn more about individual attacks, the organizations involved, and their implications in crime
scenes. Consequently, because these relatively
simple devices collect large amounts of data, all
of the processing that enables their functionality
is performed by computers connected via the Internet. As a result, the simple hardware of the
node devices, paired with the complex software
of the destination computers, provides unique
challenges for forensics teams (Yaqoob, Hashem,
Ahmed, Kazmi, & Hong, 2019).

The never-before-seen proliferation of interconnected low-power computing devices, patently
dubbed the Internet of Things (IoT), is revolutionizing how people, organizations, and malicious actors interact with one another and the
Internet. These devices are used in a variety of applications in homes and commercial
fields like medicine, education, and transportation (Al-Fuqaha, Guizani, Mohammadi, Aledhari, & Ayyash, 2015). The IoT has introduced
a new paradigm of machine interconnectedness
by allowing IoT-capable devices to communicate
with each other to share information. IoT devices provide a wealth of information about their
surroundings, and their use in cyberattacks is of

The heterogeneous nature of IoT nodes further
contributes to the challenges of IoT forensics.
These nodes are made by numerous global manufacturers and use varying software, hardware,
1
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works and which device families they apply to,
as well as modifications that may extend them
to other device families. Section 6 summarizes
lessons learned and concludes the study.

and distributed network architectures. This heterogeneity makes the invention of a universal
tool or reference standard to aid in performing
IoT forensic investigations highly unlikely (AlSadi, Chen, & Haddad, 2018; Guth, Breitenbucher, Falkenthal, Leymann, & Reinfurt, 2016).
This unique issue is a significant challenge in the
emerging field of IoT forensics. The lack of a
standard framework or toolkit applicable to a variety of IoT endpoints creates a unique environment for investigators to navigate and requires
experts that are highly specialized in the lowest level technical aspects of the IoT (Oriwoh,
Jazani, & Epiphaniou, 2013). Previous works
by Stoyanava et al. (Stoyanova, Nikoloudakis,
Panagiotakis, Pallis, & Markakis, 2020) and Atlam et al. (Atlam, El-Din Hemdan, Alenezi,
Alassafi, & Wills, 2020)focus on providing an
overall review into the field of IoT Forensics.
This paper aims to guide the data discovery
process for IoT forensics by examining and addressing the challenges of IoT forensic investigations from a practical standpoint. We examine
the hardware and software architectures of specific IoT devices as well as developing paradigms
of IoT devices in terms of their suitability for
forensic investigations. Additionally, we consider
what areas of the network relevant data may
reside, challenges of accessing those areas, and
methods and frameworks developed to assist in
those investigations. This paper presents a series of research surveys involving IoT devices,
corresponding frameworks, and methods aimed
at forensic investigators. Thereby, we provide
forensic investigators and researchers a roadmap
to forensic approaches for standard IoT devices,
challenges present in IoT forensics, and methods and frameworks for approaching current IoT
forensics and new IoT paradigms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 briefly discusses the concept of digital
forensics and IoT forensics. Section 3 presents a
generic overview of IoT architectures. Specific
devices and families, their software-hardware
and network architectures, as well as developing
IoT paradigms and their respective challenges,
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides a
discussion of the available methods and frame-

2.
2.1

DIGITAL AND IOT
FORENSICS
Overview of Digital Forensics

Digital forensics is the science of the identification and interpretation of information contained
within digital devices, including IoT devices, in
a way that preserves the integrity of the data.
Like traditional forensics, the critical use of digital forensics is to prepare evidentiary documents
for legal proceedings. Thus, digital forensics
relies heavily on scientifically validated acquisition methods and tools in order to produce
forensically sound results that can withstand
the scrutiny of the judicial system (Chernyshev,
Zeadally, Baig, & Woodward, 2018). This lack of
standards poses an exciting challenge to forensic
examiners working on newer, non-standard devices or data storage systems that cannot support entrenched tools, frameworks, and methodologies. In the modern era of computing, forensic
examiners must often develop and validate these
on their own in order to target specific systems
(Watson & Dehghantanha, 2016).
Research in digital forensics is essential to discover new methods to extract information and
validate current digital forensics methods. Research is especially imperative in IoT forensics,
where many devices are heterogeneous in design and often developed using proprietary computer organizations and architectures that will
often not be available for access under standard
modes of operation. In addition to on-device
forensics, the requirements of IoT investigations
may extend to the examination of cloud or network data. Thus, we can break down the field
of IoT forensics into three subcategories based
on the location of forensic artifacts: on-device,
network-level, and cloud forensics (Chernyshev
et al., 2018; Stoyanova et al., 2020). These three
subdivisions provide varying types of forensic evidence contained in different artifacts depending
2
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be noted that both of these examples are only
highly applicable in cyber defense contexts where
privacy is a non-issue, whereas, in public investigations, this would be difficult to implement
without infringing upon an individual’s right to
privacy. Unfortunately, unlike traditional digital forensics and mobile forensics, these laws are
somewhat ill-defined in the US code of law as far
as IoT devices are specifically concerned (Weber,
2010; Maras, 2015; Peppet, 2014).

upon which layer of the IoT the extraction takes
place. We expand upon this forensic model and
generalize it into an architecture model in Section III of this paper.

2.2

What is IoT Forensics?

Due to the wide variety of IoT devices, it is hard
to define IoT forensics using specific devices. Instead, digital forensic methods to extract information associated with or contained within IoT
devices can be considered IoT forensics. The heterogeneity of IoT devices leads to multiple areas
within digital forensics, such as network forensics, memory forensics, cloud forensics, hardware
forensics, and many more.

2.3

3.

GENERIC OVERVIEW OF
IOT DEVICE
ARCHITECTURES

Attempting to design a generic architecture for
IoT has been the subject of much research,
though no apparent standard exists. This lack
of standards can be partially attributed to the
heterogeneous nature of IoT ecosystems and the
lack of universal standardization indicating exactly how an IoT device should operate. Many
authors have attempted a realization of a generic
architecture and seem to have arrived, apparently independently, at a similar five-layer model
(Zhong, Zhu, & Huang, 2015; Mrabet, Belguith,
Alhomoud, & Jemai, 2020; Guth et al., 2016).
We present a version of this layered model in
Table I as it is beneficial to concretely define areas of an IoT ecosystem when discussing varying devices, tools, frameworks, and implementations. Since, in certain implementations, components may have altered functions or be omitted
entirely, it is convenient to keep this model abstract, not potentially to exclude any systems.

Why Do IoT Forensics?

In addition to the wealth of information that
can potentially be extracted from IoT devices
and their component networks, the vast domain
of applications of IoT devices is a primary reason those forensic examiners will want to pursue
IoT forensic investigations. Unlike traditional
digital forensics, which focuses primarily on indevice data from computers, laptops, portable
storage devices, and other personal devices, IoT
expands the scope of computing (and therefore
digital forensics) to monitoring systems, vehicles,
healthcare devices, surveillance systems, and intelligent home systems (Jahankhani & Ibarra,
2019; Huang, Lu, & Choo, 2017).
Furthermore, IoT forensics has many more applications than simply collecting data from a
crime scene. Systems can be created by forensic examiners or cybersecurity professionals for
the express purpose of collecting artifacts in a
network in order to detect cyber attacks or to
assist in forensically examining an attack postexecution (Zhang, Upton, Beebe, & Choo, 2020;
Chhabra, Singh, & Singh, 2018; Widiyasono, Putra, Giriantari, & Sudarma, 2019). These systems are most often found in cybersecurity applications on private networks as a cyber defense
strategy. Additionally, systems can be developed with forensic-aware architectures that provide easier access to artifacts and exposes log
files, network information, and on-device data
more easily (Zawoad & Hasan, 2015). It should

3.1

Physical Interface Layer

The physical interface layer (Mrabet et al., 2020)
is the fundamental element of an IoT device. Ondevice, this layer is composed of hardware sensors or actuators that allow the device to interface with the physical world around it. This interface may be gathering information and translating it into data in the case of sensors or physically manipulating something in its vicinity via
mechanical action. An example of an IoT device
that uses sensors would be an Amazon Alexa or
Google Nest. In contrast, an example of an IoT
3
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is responsible for controlling the sensing and actuating at the physical interface layer, performing operations on that data, sending the data to
the integration layer via the network/transport
layer, receiving data from the integration layer,
and finally translating and presenting that data
at the presentation layer. Like any other modern
computer, devices are controlled by operating
systems with varying degrees of sophistication
and integrate with the physical interface layer
and the network/transport layers using driver
software. Specific hardware may be implemented
on a device that reduces the need for OS or driver
overhead. However, it can generally be assumed
that both of these software are needed to enhance
reliability and compatibility through updates except in particular instances. This paper features
a more in-depth discussion of specific devices at
each layer in section IV.

Table 1: Generic IoT device
Layer
Components
Physical In- Sensors, Actuterface Layer ators

Device Layer

Network
/Transport
Layer
Presentation
Layer

Integration
Layer

Architecture
Artifacts
Protocol
packets,
routing tables, device
identifiers,
raw sensor
or actuator
data
Device-level
Bytes from
hardware
memory,
and software, logs, appliOperating
cation data,
System
authentication
data,
containers
NetworkPacket
specific proto- traces, firecols, TCP/IP, wall alerts
UDP/IP,
Speakers,
User-level
screens, user informainterfaces
tion, usage
information
Cloud
ser- Humanvices,
IoT readable
middleware,
data,
logs,
companion
usage
hisapps
tory,
user
information

3.3

The network layer (Mrabet et al., 2020) consists
of any wired or wireless protocols supporting IoT
networking. This layer includes Ethernet, Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, ZigBee, 5G, and associated transport
protocols such as TCP/IP and UDP/IP. This
layer is the layer at which device-to-device or
device-to-gateway connections occur and may involve the sharing of data generated at the physical interface layer between devices or the routing
of this data up to integration services at the integration layer. It also includes the flow of data
down from the integration layer into the presentation layer. Artifacts at this layer include incoming and outgoing network packets or connection information. Further, all remote crimes that
are committed leveraging IoT (botnets, cyberstalking) can be expected to generate artifacts
on the network layer.

device that uses actuators would be a networkconnected robotic arm (often found in industrial applications), an intelligent pacemaker, or
an IoT oven. This layer will often require localized software to operate its components and
may store artifacts of its sensor or actuator data
locally, in the cloud, or on a companion device
(such as a smartphone or tablet). Many noncyber crime forensic investigations will focus on
artifacts generated at this layer.

3.2

Network/Transport Layer

3.4

Presentation Layer

The presentation layer (Mrabet et al., 2020)
is the non-sensing human-interface layer of the
device. This layer provides end-user feedback
either through its physical interface layer (on
a speaker or screen) or through a connected
command-and-control application on a companion device. This layer involves displaying data

Device Layer

The device layer (Mrabet et al., 2020) simply
refers to the device itself and the associated hardware and software that composes it. The device
4
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look at a few of these devices and developing
IoT paradigms, such as the Internet of Medical
Things and the Internet of Industrial Things, examine potential sources of forensic artifacts, and
discuss some of the related challenges.

either generated by the device, by the integration layer, or jointly from both. Devices will
often require interface software to provide this
feedback.

3.5

Integration Layer

4.1

The integration layer(cloud services layer
(Mrabet et al., 2020)) is the upstream non-local
component of IoT and is responsible for doing
complex computations, long-term storage of
data, off-device command and control functions,
and enhancing or enabling device functionality. This layer is the layer that enables IoT
devices to be decentralized from their primary
computing functions. This layer is enabled by
cloud, middleware, and database technologies.
It will often be located off-site except for in
the cases of companion clients, though specific
IoT architectures, often found in industrial or
secure settings, may support local integration
for security, confidentiality, or convenience. This
layer will often contain valuable information for
forensic investigations, particularly if the device
in question has a comparatively small reserve
of local memory for its function or exposes an
interface to the end-user through a companion
client. In the cloud or an integrated database,
the primary issue at this layer is accessed since
it will require permission, either voluntarily or
compulsory through a subpoena, to access the
data stores.

Amazon Alexa Ecosystem

Figure 1:
Amazon
(Pawlaszczyk et al., 2019)

Alexa

Ecosystem

The Echo is a brand of home smart speaker
systems developed by Amazon and first released
in late 2014 (Newman, 2020). It has various features that include playing music, voice interaction, and making lists. These various features
are made possible by integrating Amazon Alexa,
a cloud-based virtual assistant AI technology developed by Amazon. These devices require a WiFi connection and a companion device (a mobile
phone, laptop, tablet) for initial setup. The companion device is no longer needed after the initial
setup is done. As an ever-increasing number of
IoT devices are added for home automation purposes, the Echo can be connected with and used
to control these smart home devices, functionally
extending its physical interaction layer.
Multiple versions and generations of the Echo
devices exist, giving rise to multiple hardware architectures. The software architecture for most
of these devices remains the same, and a simplified version of the software architecture is
given in Figure 1 (from (Pawlaszczyk et al.,
2019)). The architecture allows for forensic artifacts to be extracted using the channels at the
network/transport layer in between the compan-

4. SPECIFIC DEVICE
ARCHITECTURES & IOT
PARADIGMS
As previously mentioned, the heterogeneity in
the architecture of IoT devices makes any attempt at accessing the device correctly to conduct forensic analysis a challenge. Depending on
the device, different forensic artifacts are generated, often in different formats and in different locations. This difference can even be observed in the same device family across generations. However, analyzing some of the architectures of typical IoT devices (like smart home
speakers) has merit as a blueprint for future investigations of other devices. In this section, we
5
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4.2

ion clients, the echo devices themselves, or the
cloud. It should be noted that since, in most
cases, the forensic analysis is done after an incident, network analysis may not prove to be helpful to the investigation unless the real-time analysis is pursued. Echo devices themselves can be
analyzed using a chip-off method outlined in AlSadi et al. to analyze forensic artifacts on device
memory (Pawlaszczyk et al., 2019). This analysis requires the hybrid RAM and eMMC to be
soldered off the device, the chip identified, and,
using an appropriate adapter, a raw image of the
memory chip can be acquired.

Google Nest Ecosystem

Google has a range of intelligent speakers similar
to Amazon’s Echo, part of its home automation
range. Google Nest (previously known as Google
Home, owned by Nest before Google acquired
them) was Google’s answer to Amazon’s Echo
range and was released in 2011. It is estimated to
have sold around 52 million units since its release
(D’Onfro, 2018). Other Google Nest products
include a smart thermostat, cameras, alarm systems, doorbells, smart locks, and smoke alarms.
All the devices require a Wi-Fi connection and
can be controlled via a companion device like a
laptop, mobile phone, or tablet.

At the integration layer, analysis on the companion client can reveal forensic artifacts about
when the Alexa app was last used, the user account associated with it, cards containing transcripts of what Alexa understood in each voice
command, and its response to the voice command in JSON format (Chung, Park, & Lee,
2017). Audio recordings and their transcripts
can be accessed on the cloud provided that the
user has not deleted them, and each recording is
stored with the date and time of the voice command. The location of artifacts on different operating systems of the companion devices has been
provided in (Chung et al., 2017)). User activity
artifacts can be extracted using Amazon’s APIs
as well, but these are not released to the public
and would require the discovery of the APIs. Potential sources of forensic artifacts in the Amazon
echo ecosystem can be summarized in Figure 2
(from (Pawlaszczyk et al., 2019)).

Figure 3: Google Nest Ecosystem (Dorai et al.,
2018)
The hardware architecture of the Nest devices
varies by device type (smart speaker vs. thermostat) and across different generations of the device. The overall software architecture is given in
Fig. 3 (from (Dorai et al., 2018)) and is similar
to the Amazon Echo ecosystem. The IoT devices are connected to the cloud in tandem with
a companion device registered to them. Different
opportunities to collect forensic artifacts exist in
the companion device, the cloud, the IoT device,
and the IoT devices’ network.
Unlike Echo devices, Nest devices do not have
persistent storage, due to which IoT device analysis may not prove valuable (Dorai et al., 2018).
Thus, this illustrates that even among competing
manufacturers of the same product type, significant differences exist in architectures. However,
forensic investigations may necessitate examining the IoT device before it can be ruled out for
not containing any relevant forensic artifacts.

Figure 2: Amazon Alexa Ecosystem Forensics
(Pawlaszczyk et al., 2019)

6
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Dorai et al. (Dorai et al., 2018) propose examining the companion devices to the Nest smart
speaker system. An unencrypted logical backup
of an iOS mobile device is taken and then examined to uncover information about user interactions with the device or the data collected by
the IoT devices. This backup is used to analyze SQLite databases on the device relating
to the Google Nest application, and an inference engine is built to analyze the data and produce a FEAAS (Forensic Evidence Acquisition
and Analysis System) report. This report contains details about the device, the app’s account,
geofence events, thermostat events, and camera
events. Camera artifacts from the Nest device
were recovered by analyzing Google Chrome’s
cache on a companion client (laptop). After
parsing the cache, links containing text files, image files, event clips, and a profile picture of the
user can be extracted (Dorai et al., 2018).

4.3

Figure 4: Windows 10 Ecosystem (Gmez et al.,
2019)
tecture and require minimal adaptation of traditional forensic techniques. Examination of the
file system can be performed using Autopsy, registry explorers and parsers, and master file table
explorers and parsers. Windows system events
can also be viewed via their associated log files
(Gmez et al., 2019).
Windows 10 IoT has an app-based framework
for programs, though it operates much the
same as the desktop version of the OS. In the
Windows 10 IoT ecosystem, apps are stored in
a directory under \Programs\WindowsApp
and the packages needed are stored
in
\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\
AppRepository\Packages.
User
information from the app is stored in
\Users\DefaultAccount\AppDate\Local\
Packages\ (Gmez et al., 2019).These apps
may provide high-value forensic evidence to an
examiner since they ultimately provide meaning
and utility to the system for the user.

Windows 10 IoT

Windows 10 IoT Core is the free version of an
IoT operating system developed by Microsoft.
This OS is optimized to run on ARM and
x86/x64 devices such as Raspberry Pi, DragonBoard 410c, AAEON Up Squared, or MinnowBoard Turbot and supports applications developed in the Universal Windows Platform
(UWP). Microsoft provides the Windows 10 IoT
Dashboard application for Windows 10 computers to allow remote access to the Windows
10 IoT system. This OS features secure boot,
BitLocker encryption, device guard, Bluetooth,
Windows Update, and hardware connection capabilities for many physical interface layer attachments, including Wi-Fi adapters, Ethernet
adapters, cameras, RFID, and other sensors.
Gmez et al. (Gmez et al., 2019) provide
a method for conducting non-volatile memory
analysis on a Windows 10 IoT system. This
forensic analysis was done on a Raspberry Pi
board with Windows 10 IoT Core installed. Nonvolatile memory analysis was performed on the
SD card from the Raspberry Pi, where the Windows IoT OS resides after installation. Conveniently, Windows 10 IoT systems are similar to
traditional Windows systems in software archi-

4.4

Smartwatches: Apple Watch and
Fitbit Versa 2

Smartwatches are a class of IoT devices similar to smartphones in that they are often on
the user’s person. They include devices like the
Apple Watch and Fitbit Versa, though they are
produced by many companies, including Samsung, Amazon, Garmin, and Fossil, to name
a few. They provide a broad range of features like health and wellness, call and messaging, time-related features (multiple timezone
display), alarms, calendars, and notifications.
7
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ies, credit card information, and credit card image artifacts. No message data was stored on
the Fitbit app even though message notifications
were sent to the Fitbit device. Further, some
user data such as OAuth refresh tokens in plaintext were recovered (Yoon & Karabiyik, 2020).

These features and their implementations vary
depending on the device model, device generations, and device maker and can be implemented
with apps depending on the sensors that the device provides. Because these devices are typically on a person’s wrist for a significant portion of a day, they can store their location, heart
rates, and fitness patterns. The architecture of
a smartwatch ecosystem generally consists of the
smartwatch device, a companion device that provides enhanced functionality and connectivity (a
local server of sorts) for the smartwatch, and the
cloud that data is backed up to and processed in.
The Apple Watch, Apple’s flagship smart wear
device intended for use with iOS, was examined
in Dorai and Houshmand et al. (Dorai et al.,
2018) The watch requires a companion iPhone
to be connected at all times to sync information,
install apps, and change settings. The content
from the Apple watch is constantly backed up
onto the companion device and is available in
the iTunes backup. The cache size for updates is
small on the device, and any that would typically
be data synced with the companion device may
be lost if the companion device is disconnected
for some time. The authors developed the Device Data and Forensic Analysis (DEFA) Model
to extract artifacts from the watch and other devices, which uses an inference engine to extract
relevant data from the activity logs. Given the
general architecture of smartwatches, it is evident that the opportunities for collecting forensic artifacts are limited to within the watch itself, the companion device, or the cloud where
the backups of the device are stored. However,
the DEFA model was used only to extract data
from the companion device, which, fortunately,
is host to much of the forensically relevant data
generated by various apps on the watch (Dorai,
Houshmand, & Aggarwal, 2020).
A Fitbit Versa 2 was analyzed using NISTapproved tools Magnet AXIOM and MSAB XRY
by Yoon et al. via its android companion device.
The main focus of the analysis was to determine
the types and sources of forensic artifacts on the
rooted companion device. The authors provide
relative paths on the smartphone to locate GPS
location, heart rate, calories burned, web cook-

4.5

Vehicles

Modern vehicles often come equipped with IoT
infotainment centers that connect with user’s
smartphones via Bluetooth and may even have
associated smartphone apps to enable additional
features. At a very minimum, these centers often provide an interface for phone-to-car music
streaming, GPS navigation, rear-view cameras,
and hands-free phone calls, and sometimes control car features, such as seat actuation and climate control. Specific models may even expose
cruise control, steering assistance, fuel economy,
and other features through this central infotainment center. Occasionally, these IoT devices
are connected, via buses, to other computerized
units of the car (Lacroix, El-Khatlib, & Akalu,
2016). This level of inter-connectedness creates
an environment that may expose a wealth of
forensic artifacts to an examiner.
The external architectures of these vehicular
devices are often simple and typically only involve a singular connection with a user’s phone,
though multiple phones may be registered to
the vehicle. Figure 5 gives an example of a
vehicle’s potential inner architecture, though it
should be noted that some vehicles may not have
all of these connections. More modern vehicles often include both an Event Data Recorder
(EDR) and insurance black box that works with
the telematics unit to provide data relevant to
crash incidents (this may provide emergency call
functionality instead or as well, like OnStar)
(Mansor, Markantonakis, Akram, Mayes, & Gurulian, 2017). Both of these units provide several data logging opportunities for forensics investigators. They may contain artifacts such as
a driver behavior profile and event information,
though both of these units provide information
inaccessible to the users and thus cannot be verified by them. Mansor et al. (Mansor et al., 2017)
propose a forensics logging mobile application,
8
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Figure 5: Internal Vehicle Network Architecture (Lacroix et al., 2016)
amination of the disk revealing navigation cart
data containing more locations in Europe used
by the navigation system. Using Photorec for file
carving, 7,431 files were carved from the WindRiver partition, of which 7,414 of them were
mp3 files, while some were playlists in text file
format (Jacobs et al., 2017).

DiaLOG, that provides more excellent privacy
features, transparency of data being transmitted
from the vehicle, and an integrity-protected data
logging feature aimed at forensic investigations.
This application may also be used to alert owners of malicious intrusion by cyberattackers to
cause a denial of service or control operations of
the vehicle (Mansor et al., 2017).

Lacroix et al. (Lacroix et al., 2016) procured
a logical dump, as well as two separate physical dumps, of the Ford-150’s SYNC infotainment file system and its associated content and
files. Ford’s SYNC architecture is based upon
Microsoft’s Windows CE automotive operating
system. It is speculated that this system may interact with telematics and communications modules and an insurance companies’ black box for
habit reporting, though this could not be confirmed without the device. Direct access to the
data inside the system is complicated without a
forensic toolkit or special forensics software since
the encryption is employed on the data itself. Using Encase and Autopsy on the logical copy, the
authors were able to retrieve a phone book containing device IDs, call names, call types, and

For forensic approaches that do not require
proaction, both Jacobs et al. (Jacobs, Choo,
Kechadi, & Le-Khac, 2017), and Lacroix et al.
(Lacroix et al., 2016) provide an in-depth examination of a 2012 Volkswagen Golf and a Ford
F-150, respectively. Jacobs et al. (Jacobs et
al., 2017) removed modules from the Volkswagen Golf in order to perform a hard-drive examination and chip-off of the multimedia device
in the vehicle. From the device’s flash memory,
they were able to retrieve the last-known GPS
coordinates of the vehicletwo partitions on the
hard drive, a FAT32 partition, and a WindRiver
Systems DosFs 2.0 partition. On the FAT32
partition, a Siemens AG 2.0.0 Europe Map version 5.0.5 was found, leading to the further ex9
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call times; Bluetooth connection attempt logs
and potential security PIN artifacts in hexadecimal formats when authenticated; logs of USB
device connections and respective file structures;
last known AM/FM frequencies and Sirius radio related information (useful for localization);
SQLite databases of fuel price listings, Wi-Fi network listings, and movie listings; GPS logs; climate state and configuration data (valid for localization); cryptographic seeds; mobile carrier
information; and Internet profile information. It
is noted that some of this information went unanalyzed, but it is apparent that the vehicle’s
infotainment system stores a multitude of forensically valuable data (Lacroix et al., 2016).

4.6

Figure 6:
IoMT Ecosystem
(Jahankhani & Ibarra, 2019)

Architecture

chain that links patients, physicians, providers,
and Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) together.
These can present unique security vulnerabilities as cyberattacks against digital medical infrastructure accounts for more than half of all
cyberattacks. As devices, patients, providers,
and CSPs have varying security standards; this
information supply chain is especially vulnerable to malicious attacks. Additionally, the network is complicated by the need for a personal
server (PS) that mediates access to IoT nodes
in or on the body (Jahankhani & Ibarra, 2019).
Smartphones are a prime candidate for personal
servers, though they introduce new vulnerabilities to the network since they are used for applications other than mediating access to IoMT
devices, acting as both monitoring devices and
delivery devices in Figure 6. However, using
a smartphone as a mediator for these devices
provides rich opportunities for forensic investigators, as mobile forensics is a well-understood
field that is more mature than IoT forensics and
may impart less heterogeneity to IoMT forensics. IoMT is still a developing field, and what
forensic artifacts may be recovered is not yet well
understood, though we would surmise that if the
PS acts as a monitoring tool, one could retrieve
state information regarding the patient and possibly reports their health.

Internet of Medical Things

Forensic analysis may be performed on medical
devices for unique reasons, including autopsy reports, medical malpractice cases, or investigating ransomware attacks. As medical devices and
data must comply with comprehensive government regulations, including the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA),
forensic investigations may be accompanied by
legal counsel. Additionally, as some medical devices are implanted into patients, retrieval and
forensic analysis may require a patient to optin to surgical procedures (Jahankhani & Ibarra,
2019). New standards have been proposed for
IoT devices operating within a clinical setting,
as there are strict ethical and legal guidelines
for medical devices in addition to storage and
protection of patient data (Liu, Sasaki, & Uehara, 2020). Liu et al. (Liu et al., 2020) propose a holistic forensic investigation approach to
comply with these standards that incorporate a
”four-space model” in understanding the integration of medical devices with patients, institutions, and digital infrastructure: cyberspace; a
”social space” incorporating legal knowledge and
industry standards; a ”physical space” where
limitations of time, space, and biological conditions are included; and a ”psychological” space
where a patient’s behaviors are included (Liu et
al., 2020).
Jahankhani and Ibarra note that Medical IoT
devices are integrated into an information supply

4.7

Internet of Industrial Things

The industrial Internet of things (IIoT), composed of both industrial control systems (ICS)
and supervisory control and data acquisition
systems, constitute the enabling technologies of
many modern national and industrial infrastruc10
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tures. These systems may be found in production facilities, power plants, nuclear facilities,
and transportation networks, and their use is
ever-increasing. These IIoT networks often expose an interface to critical systems and are thus
prime attack vectors for malicious cyber actors,
and because of the criticality of IIoT networks,
they are the subject of much academic research
in cybersecurity (Eden et al., 2017). However,
examining their forensic value is an area of research that is still somewhat undeveloped even
though they may contain artifacts that would
enable forensic investigators to construct timelines of critical events, including cyberattacks,
industrial-related fatalities, catastrophic failures,
and general foul play. Typically, the architectures of these systems will be implementationdependent. However, they all follow the 5-layer
model outlined earlier in this paper.

nication network also provides an opportunity
for forensic artifact collection using familiar tools
such as Wireshark. However, forensically interesting network traffic will often include packets whose contents are explicitly formatted for
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), RealTime Automatic Controllers (RTACs), and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and will need to
be translated depending upon the model and
packet specification of the intended destination.
Field devices must be assessed independently,
but forensic investigations involving them may
benefit from volatile memory analysis, chip-off
methods, and side-channel methods (Awad et al.,
2018).

5.

FRAMEWORKS &
METHODS

While investigators require tools and toolkits in
order to conduct forensics examination of IoT
devices, these have already been enumerated
and evaluated extensively in Venkauskas et al.
(Venkauskas, Toldinas, Grigalinas, Damaeviius,
& Jusas, 2015). However, many of these tools
and toolkits are challenging to apply to IoT systems simply due to the heterogeneity of devices.
Forensic investigators and researchers often develop frameworks and methodologies for pursuing an IoT-based forensic investigation to address this challenge. Many of these frameworks
and methodologies focus on proactive forensics,
while some provide responsive models. In general, most of the work centered primarily upon
model-building only superficially discusses possible approaches to IoT forensics. Nevertheless,
this section briefly surveys state-of-the-art research in IoT forensics, and each may potentially
be achieved.

Figure 7: IIoT Ecosystem (Awad et al., 2018)
Unfortunately, as is the case in all IoT forensics, the heterogeneity of these systems poses
a significant challenge to investigators. However, the components of these systems are even
less uniform and often more low-level than other
types of devices (Awad et al., 2018). Fortunately, the control center is often composed of
traditional computing systems, running a standard OS such as Linux or Windows. Provided
that these terminals have serial or wireless interfaces, extracting data from them becomes a
digital forensics issue and can be done using any
number of standard toolkits, including Autopsy,
Volatility, Rekall, and other automated analysis systems (Awad et al., 2018). The commu-

5.1

Frameworks

This subsection presents some generalized frameworks for the identification and analysis of forensic evidence on IoT systems. Currently, there exists no widely accepted framework for conducting IoT investigations. This fact not only complicates the extraction and analysis of evidence
that would be admissible in a court of law, but
11
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vide a database of information for researchers
and investigators to access and often involve
the real-time acquisition of data over the Internet and the subsequent storage of that information for later examination or preprocessing by
an Artifical Intelligence (AI) or Machine Learning (ML) model. These approaches can often essentially be qualified as big-data approaches because they are aggregating large amounts of data
to be processed. These platforms may provide
valuable information to security professionals
and forensic researchers in the pre-investigation
stages.
Torabi et al. (Torabi, Bou-Harb, Assi, & Debbabi, 2020) developed a system composed of an
IoT data collection module, a darknet data collection module, an IoT threat repository, and an
IoT traffic analysis module. The IoT data collection module would capture data ”in the wild” to
identify exploited devices and analyze data packets identified by the module. The darknet data
collection module, which aggregates data from
the UCSD real-time network telescope, would
correlate dark data with the data collected by
the IoT collection module to identify ”suspicious
IoT-generated activities”. The IoT traffic analysis module would then identify compromised or
exploited IoT devices and use the IoT threat
repository to label malicious and compromised
IoT devices. The model was tested on 4TB data
set of network information and identified 27,849
compromised IoT devices that generated more
than 300 million unsolicited packets (Torabi et
al., 2020).

it also leaves these issues to the investigator to
solve. Further, existing digital forensics frameworks may not be applicable, or only partially
so, to IoT investigations even in research environments (Kebande & Ray, 2016).
Kebande & Ray et al. (Kebande & Ray,
2016) present an IoT framework based upon the
ISO/IEC 27043: 2015, an international standard for security and incident investigation principles. The framework identifies four stages of
IoT forensics: the proactive process, IoT forensics, the reactive process, and concurrent processes. The authors also compare their framework with other proposed frameworks and finally offer a critical evaluation of the framework
(Kebande & Ray, 2016).
Kebande & Karie (Kebande et al., 2018), extend the research mentioned above into a multidimensional framework. This comprehensive
framework specifies nine sub-processes to provide
greater fidelity of the framework for forensic application and more closely match the ISO/IEC
models. The new model takes into account the
IoT network, readiness processes, management,
policies, and standards (Kebande et al., 2018).
Kumar et al. (Kumar, Saha, Lal, & Conti,
2021), present an efficient blockchain-based IoT
forensics framework while considering consortium blockchain to maintain the chain of custody in cross-border forensic investigations. The
use of a Programmable Hash Function (PHF) in
their approach allows for better blockchain security with a reasonable level of performance.
This framework does not follow any ISO standards compared to (Kebande & Ray, 2016).
Hossain et al. (Hossain, Karim, & Hasan,
2018)propose using a public digital ledger (similar to bitcoin) based IoT forensic framework
FIF-IoT. FIF-IOT can provide interfaces for evidence collection and use a tamper-proof scheme
to maintain the integrity of evidence during a
criminal investigation. Again, unlike (Kebande
et al., 2018) does not follow any ISO standard
explicitly.

5.2

5.3

Real-Time Forensics

Real-Time analysis is a device-level technique
that can prove invaluable for forensic investigators who are doing on-site analysis or otherwise
have access to a device while it is running or
in use. Though this will rarely be applicable in
legal cases, the technique is helpful for malware
and cyberattack investigation and cases in which
access to the device is otherwise restricted. It
is also helpful for investigations in which the device has no or little onboard memory to examine.
Often, IoT devices operate as a black box from
the viewpoint of investigators due to the lack of

Forensics Platforms

Some researchers have proposed platform-based
IoT forensic models. These platform models pro12
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determining what data is forensically valuable in
a relatively short time (Kebande et al., 2020; Koroniotis, Moustafa, & Sitnikova, 2020). An exhaustive and up-to-date (at the time of writing)
survey of ML and AI-based forensic models can
be found in Kebande & Ikuesan et al. (Kebande
et al., 2020).
Koroniotis et al. (Koroniotis et al., 2020)
present a deep-learning framework for IoT network forensics called a particle deep framework
(PDF), describing investigation phases for identifying and analyzing IoT attack behaviors. The
author’s framework outlines the process of extracting data flows, implementing particle swarm
optimization (PSO) algorithm to adapt the deep
learning parameters, and developing a deep neural network based on the algorithm to uncover
and trace abnormal events in the network. This
framework is specifically targeted for use in intelligent home networks but is likely adaptable to
other types of IoT networks as well (Koroniotis
et al., 2020).

standardization and publication of their internal mechanisms (Sayakkara, Le-Khac, & Scanlon, 2019). Real-time analysis is a method that
assists in overcoming this challenge.
Zhou et al. (Zhou, Hu, & Makris, 2020)
present an architecture-neutral non-intrusive
real-time workload analysis framework for process tracing that leverages, in their case, ARM
CoreSight. This framework requires the implementation of an on-device hardware tracing
module. However, some architectures, such as
those from ARM and Intel, already implement
this module. The authors evaluate the framework on a Zedboard - a Zynq-7000 FPGA embedding an ARM Cortex-A9 core and evaluate the
traces generated by the ARM CoreSight module
using several machine-learning models (Zhou et
al., 2020).
Sayakkara et al. (Sayakkara et al., 2019)
examine the efficacy of electromagnetic sidechannel analysis (EM-SCA) on a Raspberry Pi
3 B + and an Arduino Leonardo. The authors
utilize a HackRF software-defined radio (SDR)
to acquire electromagnetic emissions from each
device, apply a Fourier transform to the traces,
average and normalize the results, and utilize a
neural network to classify the results in order to
detect and classify possible cryptographic algorithms executing on the devices. The authors
note that both of these devices run heavyweight
operating systems and posit that the method
they supply could potentially achieve greater
accuracy and recover a greater fidelity of information on simpler devices with fewer cores
(Sayakkara et al., 2019).

5.4

5.5

Blockchain-based Forensics

Many authors have proposed a blockchain model
for IoT forensics that involves the insertion
of a new forensics layer between the network
layer and integration layer (Nakamoto, 2008;
Le, Meng, Su, Yeo, & Thing, 2018; Yazdinejad,
Parizi, Dehghantanha, Zhang, & Choo, 2020;
Ryu, Sharma, Jo, & Park, 2019; Hossain et
al., 2018). These proposed methods solve the
problem of heterogeneity in IoT but require a
change in paradigm that may not be widely implementable. The blockchain layer would require
integration-provider buy-in and implementation
or linking that makes this approach somewhat
unpragmatic. However, it may have significant
value in systems where command and control are
provided and managed by the system’s user, such
as in the industrial Internet of things, medical
Internet of things, or military Internet of things.
The concept of the blockchain was introduced
by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, concurrent with
the creation of Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008). It consists of chains of digital ledgers called blocks that
are managed jointly by all hosts on a peer-to-peer
network with the intent of transparency and ver-

Machine Learning and Artificial
Intelligence Based Forensics

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) is a well-developed and ever-maturing
field of research with an extensive range of
applications. These models in forensics have
gained increasing interest in recent years and
are already common in cybersecurity applications. The value of Machine learning and Artificial Intelligence-based forensics approaches is
two-fold: they help preserve the privacy of the
device owner, and they assist the investigator in
13
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5.6

ification from all participating hosts (Nakamoto,
2008). Since its introduction to the world,
blockchain has been applied in almost every sector from finance to agriculture (Yazdinejad et al.,
2020).

Fog-based Forensics

Some authors have proposed a fog solution to
IoT forensics that involves migrating computation power and data storage closer to the IoT implementation (Al-Masri, Bai, & Li, 2018; Huang
et al., 2017). These solutions involve adding
nodes to the network that act as mediators to the
upstream integration-layer services and perform
some of the integration-layer work on-site instead
of in the cloud or on a backend. This solution
solves some forensic issues, such as cyberattacks,
by aggregating and interpreting forensic data on
a single node. However, this potentially exposes
forensic evidence to physical tampering and only
partially solves heterogeneity since each device
family would need a separate fog computer. Additionally, like blockchain-based methods, this
requires integration service provider buy-in and
restructuring of the larger IoT ecosystem as a
whole, making it unrealistic for consumer-level
devices but plausible for the industrial Internet
of things, Internet of medical things, and Internet of military things.
Al-Masri et al. (Al-Masri et al., 2018) present
the concept of a Fog-Based IoT Forensic Framework (FoBI) that is implemented on a generic fog
node. FoBI requires the use of in-built ML algorithms to determine suspicious activity on the
end devices. This essentially constitutes user entity and behavior analytics (UEBA) to construct
profiles of device users and compare device use in
real-time with the profile using log files and network packet aggregation. Suppose a mismatch
between behavior and the profile occurs past a
threshold. In that case, the fog node notifies
other IoT devices on the network to stop executing instructions via message queuing telemetry
transport (MQTT) until further analysis determines there is no longer a present threat or the
system owner is notified. FoBI also includes using an evidence collection module that creates
a forensic image of all data residing on the IoT
nodes using bit-stream imaging and process examination and generates reports. This model has
not been tested (Al-Masri et al., 2018).
Huang et al. (Huang et al., 2017) suggest a
fog computing framework for vehicles using road-

Yazdinejad et al. (Yazdinejad et al., 2020)
propose a blockchain organization in which the
network is divided into software-defined network
(SDN) clusters, each with an SDN controller that
acts as a cluster head. Both public and private blockchain layers are inserted between these
clusters to act as verified ledgers of forensic evidence. For SDN to SDN connections, a public
blockchain network is maintained that new SDNs
are free to join and participate in. Between the
SDN head and individual IoT devices, a private
blockchain is maintained that requires validation
by the network starter or set rules dictated by the
network starter. The authors tested this architecture using the Pyethereum test tool from the
Ethereum platform (Le et al., 2018).
Le et al. (Yazdinejad et al., 2020) propose a
framework that implements a law-enforcementmanaged blockchain that defines a device from
which evidence is generated as a digital witness (DW). A law enforcement agency (LEA)
designated a digital custodian (DC) to examine
the evidence. The LEA acts as a provider of
the blockchain platform and is the only entity
allowed to verify each transaction on the network and write to ledgers, and all other entities
can read and write transactions. This network
uses a Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus algorithm where unverified transactions
are collected by the LEA, formed into a block,
and broadcast back to the network for community verification. The author’s framework has
not been tested, and an analysis of its effectiveness and soundness on an IoT network would be
needed to evaluate its effectiveness. Further, it
has not been examined in a legal sense and allowing LEAs sole access to the blockchain platform may likely constitute privacy violations and
cause a considerable amount of legal trouble to
citeb47.
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placed into it.Future work involves further research into general frameworks and tools for IoT
forensics while discovering sources for evidence
collection in IoT devices.

side fog nodes for data collection and processing
for both forensics and real-time traffic control.
These fog nodes connect to a higher-level cloud
system responsible for aggregating and storing
data and providing larger-scale traffic control.
This model, of course, relies upon the buy-in
of local government and a yet-to-be-developed
data fusion algorithm to account for the different formats of vehicle manufacturers. However,
the authors also conduct a theoretical analysis
of cyberattacks on these systems and propose an
evidence-based system forensics approach that
relies upon adjacent nodes and intelligent vehicles to determine a given fog node’s validity (compromised or not-compromised). These
countermeasure approaches may have useful applications in other fog-based systems (Huang et
al., 2017).
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